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Noms
CANON 35: CAMERAS, COURTS AND CONFUSION
I.

INTRODUCTON

Canon 35,1 which provides that press photography and radio or
television broadcasts should not be permitted in the courtroom, was
reaffirmed by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its meeting in New Orleans on February 4-5, 1963.2
The canon, with minor deletions approved by the House in parenthesis, now reads in part as follows:
Canon 35
Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings in court shall be
conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs m the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses

between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings, (are calculated to) detract from the essential dignity of
the proceedings, distract participants and witnesses in giving testi-

mony, (degrade the court) and create misconceptions with respect
thereto m the mind of the public and should not be permitted.3
Tns reaffirmation by the policy-making body of the ABA represents the end of years of indecision by that group on the advisability
of modifying the absolute exclusionary feature of the canon in light
of great technological refinements in photography and broadcast
equipment. The House agreed with the findings of a special ABA
study committee to the effect that, despite gains in technology, the
paraphernalia connected with the media's presence in the courtrooms
tends to disrupt normal judicial atmosphere and jeopardizes the
4
right to a fair trial.
The basic assumption of Canon 35 is that photography and broadcasting detract from the dignity of the proceedings, distract participants and create public misconceptions. It is the purpose of tlus
paper to show that this assumption is no longer valid, and if the
audio-video media's exclusion is to be justifiably continued, the
canon should be reworded so as to include the real reasons why
the media should be excluded. As one writer has said:
If the magnificient isolation prescribed by Canon 85 is to be maintamed, we still need5 a better reason for maintaining it than the Canon
presently contains.

The wording of the canon has not been basically changed since
its inception when the equipment was assumed to cause.what we will
1
2

American Bar Association s Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Amencan Bar News, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 1, Feb. 15, 1963.

sId. at 8.
4 Id. at 1.
5 Miller, Should Canon 35 be Amended? A Question of Fair Trial and Free

Information, 42 A.BA.J. 884, 398 (1956).
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term a "physical" interference with the fair administration of justice
in that the bulky and noisy presence of the media equipment alone,
detracts from the dignity, distracts participants and creates nmsconceptions. As the media are proving, this physical interference no
longer exists.
However, the Canon's exclusion of the media is well justified
on other grounds. While the media argue that they cause no physical
interference and therefore their exclusion is unjustified, the legal
profession defends the exclusion with reasons extrinsic to those stated
in the canon. The profession argues mainly that the presence of
cameras and microphones-direct representatives of unseen millionscauses witnesses and participants to either "clam up" or "ham t up"
that judges and attorneys will "play" for votes; that in the face of
editorial scorn, a vote-conscious judge will admit the media where
justice demands he should not; and, that the court has a duty to
protect a certain right of privacy of participants. We will label these
as "psychological" interferences. They represent the true reasons why
the media should be excluded. Yet, the outdated wording of Canon
35, merely ignoring these reasons, has just been reaffirmed.
The highest courts of at least two states have recently decided
to relax the absolute exclusion. 6 This alone should be an indication
to the profession that if the absolute exclusion is to be maintained, the
canon's wording must be updated.
A. History of Canon 35
Canon 35 was adopted by the House of Delegates in 1937 following a year-long study of the then-existing 34 Canons of Judicial
Ethics. The reasons for adopting the canon were clear. As one writer
states:
Although the Committee s report did not disclose any of the reasons
wich prompted the proposal, the sensational publicity which engulfed the Hall-Mills, Cray-Snyder, Bruno Hauptmann proceedings,
and other trials in the 1920s and 1930s left no doubt that the legal
profession had to curb the abuses of the information media in order
and insure the prompt and imto preserve the dignity of the court
partial administration of justice.7
The original canon was directed only at photography and radio
broadcasting. However, in 1952 the House of Delegates extended the
ban to include television.8
6In re Hearings, 296 P. 2d 465 (Colo. 1956); Lyles v. State, 830 P. 2d 734
(Okla.7 1958).
Oppenheim, Shall We Have Cameras in Our CQurtrooms?, 4 Student Law.
J. 19 (Dec. 1958).
8Ind.

NomS
Because of constant pressure from the press, special committees
were appointed in 1954 and 1955 to investigate the advisability of
altering the canon. In a report made public November 1, 1957, the
committee recommended no change in the exclusion in Canon 35,
but did recommend a change in the phraseology to comprehend the
psychological interferences. The House rejected this proposal in 1958
and referred the matter to the committee 9 which recommended the
reaffirmation of the canon, mentioned above.10
Canon 35, or a rule similar in nature, has been adopted in 16
states,"1 including Kentucky. 2 State bar associations have accepted
it in 10 states, and the remainder of the states either allow coverage
1
or have no written rule.
The federal courts are committed to the exclusion by Rule 53
14
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
B. Weight of Canon 35
The weight of the canon in enforcing a standard of conduct on
members of the profession was generally stated by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in a recent case:
The adoption of the canons of ethics by the courts did not give

the canons force of law. They are nothing more than a system of
principles of exemplary conduct and good character. They are recommended to the bench and bar as patterns which, if adhered to, will
promote respect for the bar and better administration of justice. 15

The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in recogmzing the canon, provides in its rules:
The court recognizes and accepts the principle embodied m the
American Bar Association s Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics
as a sound statement of the standard of professional conduct required of members of the Bench and Bar, and the court regards
9

Courtroom Photography Research Report, 26 J. Bar Ass n Kan. 197, 315

(1958).
1o Amencan Bar News, Feb. 1, 1963 (Press release of Midyear Meetings).
11 Op enheim, supra note 7, at 20.
12 Rues Ky. Ct. App. 3.170 (1963).
ia Oppenheun, supra note 7, at 20.
14 Fed.

R. Crn. P. 53 states: "The taking of photographs m the courtroom

during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall not be permitted by the court.'
In addition to this statute, on March 12, 1962, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, consisting of the chief judges of the federal courts and presided
over by the Chief Justice of the United States, adopted a unammous resolution
condemmng photography of and broadcasting from the courtroom as "inconsistent with fair judicial procedure" and stating it ought not be permitted in any
federal court. Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Professon: Canon 85 Should
Not Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615, 618 (1962).

15 Lyles v. State, 330 P. 2d 734, 738 (Okla. 1958).
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these Canons as persuasive authority in all disciplinary proceedings

against members of the Bar.16

Generally, the canon has only persuasive power and will have
the effect of law only when its violation is also a violation of the
parties' rights to a fair trial.i7 Therefore the exclusion of the media
cannot be legally enforced under the canon but must be based on
the threat to the fair administration of justice. The assumption n
the canon that the media do pose a necessary threat, however, is
persuasive to judges in their determination as to the existence of an
actual threat.
C. Press Efforts t0 Revise Canon 35
The press' crusade to effect a change in the canon dates back to
the canon's inception, reaching its peak in the middle 1950's and early
1960's. As a 1956 article states:
Representatives of the media through the Amencan Society of
Newspaper Editors, the National Press Photographers Association,
the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, and
other organizations have launched and are relentlessly pursuing a
well-planned and forceful campaign to secure a modification of the
Canon. That they have made progress in this campaign cannot be
demed.1S
As a tangible fruit of the campaign, a number of states have permitted the media access to the courts on an exepnmental or ruleapproved basis including Colorado, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Texas.i 9 The National Press Photographers Association
reports nearly 200 judges have permitted courtroom press photography,
and at least three states, Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas, have modified their canons and rules to allow photography and broadcasting
20
in the discretion of the individual judge.
The degree of committment to the campaign by the media is
indicated in a statement made by one of the clef spokesmen, John
Daly, vice-president of the ABC Television Network:
Rules Ky. Ct. App. 3.170 (1963).
Lyles v. State, 330 P. 2d 734 (Okla. 1958).
is Tinkhain, Should Canon 85 Be Amended? A Question of Proper judicil
Admintstration, 42 A.B.A.J. 843 (1956). justice Douglas gives one example of
16
17

the intensity of the campaign:
In one state the radio and television industry leveled its guns at a
court which had banned those broadcasters. At 15-minute intervals
there were spot announcements over the air reminding the people
that 'the courts do not belong to the lawyers and urging the listeners to get busy and write the members of the court to change
the rule. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 1 (1960).
19
Oppenheim,
supra note 7, at 20.
20
1 b.
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NOTES
We have an obligation to ourselves, to the public, and to our way
of life to accept nothing short of full freedom
of information and
2
access. We cannot and will not stop short 1

The media are pledged to an all-out campaign to gain access to the
courtrooms. If the profession believes the psychological distractions
justify the denial of tius access, it must fortify the defense of the
canon. A rewording so as to include these psychological distractions
as a reason for denying the media access to the courtrooms is necessary to that defense.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY POWER OF THE COURT
Assuming there is a threat by the media to the fair administration
of justice in the courts, it is well-settled the courts have an inherent
power to exclude the media even to the derogation of freedoms of
the press and speech, or the publics "right to know" of the proceedings. This power lies in the court's inherent interest in the fair administration of justice and has, on occasion, also been partly based
on the court's claimed duty of protecting a right of privacy of the
participants.
A. Freedom of Speech and Press

The development of the principle that the court's exclusionary
power is superior to the freedoms of press and speech when in con-

flict was not without its difficulties. 22 As stated by Justice Frankfurter in a leading case,
freedom of the press, properly conceived, is basic to our Constitutional system. Safeguards for the fair administration of criminal
justice are enshnned m our Bill of Eights. Respect for both of these
indispensible elements of our constitutional system presents some of
the most difficult and delicate problems for adjudication.
23
21Address by John Daly, Section of Bar Activities of the American Bar
Association,
New York City, New York, July 15, 1957.
22
Speaking generally on the interplay between the press industry and the
legal profession, one wxiter states:
Relationships between the press and the legal and judicial professions have never been particularly cordial. Each group, approaching
mutual problems from its own framework, accuses the other of base
motives in its dealings and opimons. Newspapers, for example, comp lam that lawyers and judges make a deliberate attempt to withhold information from them, and thus undermine the constitutional
right of 'freedom of the press The lawyers and judges, on the other
hand, retort that newspapers are a big business, dedicated to profit,
not public enlightenment, and that, they distort or slant legal information to make it sensational and salable. The legal profession has
its own constitutional password, the right of the accused to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Gels and Talley, Cameras sn the Courtroom, 47 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 546 (1956-1957).
2
3 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

[Vol. 51,

1. The court's authority is exclusive
When these two principles clash, one or the other must yield.
It is obvious which one must be held dominant:
In the present situation, while it is recognized that the public should
have the fullest information about the courts, it is more important
that every litigant have a fair trial. The rights of the individual
person to a fair trial are of such paramount importance
as to require
24
the most scrupulous attention and protection.

Among the cases upholding this principle is State v. Clifford,25 decided
in 1954, in which a photographer violated a court order forbidding
photographs at the arraignment of a person indicated for embezzlement. The court said:
A judge is at all times during the sessions of the court empowered
to maintain decorum and enforce reasonable rules to insure the
orderly and judicious disposition of the court's business.
When
the court is m session it is under the complete control of the judge
whose directions, reasonably necessary to mantamn order and prevent unnecessary disturbance and distraction, must be obeyed
and m preserving such right, the court does not interfere with the
freedom of the press. 2 6 (Emphasis added.)

Chief Justice Hughes in a 1941 case, foresaw a danger even to
the press itself if it were to be allowed to supersede the power of
the court. He said:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order which
27 liberty
itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.

Another writer perhaps phrases this thought in more defimte language:
[A]s freedom of speech does not allow the free speaker to shout
"fire" in a crowded theatre, so also freedom of press does not allow
24

Cedarquist, The Case for Canon 85, 24 Nev. St. B.J. 101, 106 (1959).
118 N.E. 2d 858 (Ohio 1954).
26 Id. at 855-56. In a recent Oregon case, the court labelled the press demands of access as the "insistence upon an unreasonable extension of the right
of the press to gather and disseminate news." State v. Langley, 323 P. 2d 301,
320 (Ore. 1958). In Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 AUt. 312 (1927), the
court's authority over its proceedings was termed "exclusive." Suggesting that
there is somewhere a balance between the two rights, the court sald:
The high importance of the press as an agency of modem civilization is nowhere more fully recognized than in courts of justice.
But the duty and disposition of the court to accord a justly
ample scope to the liberty of the press should not be camed to the
point of an undue abridgment of the court's own freedom.
In
this case the liberty of the press has been invoked in support of
acts which were an invasion of the domain within which the authority of the courts is exclusive. Ex parte Sturm, supra at 316.
2
7 Cox v. New Hampshire, 812 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
25

NoTms
unrestricted free pressure upon the only protection to its freedom pos28
sessed by a free society.
2. The court does not exist to furnish entertainment

Another reason the supervisory power of the court is held dominant, is the belief that the sole function of a court is to administer
justice and not to furnish entertainment or even education. This
objection to the presence of cameras or microphones is based to some
extent on their threat to the actual decorum of the courtroom, 29
but more so on the threat of distorting the general image of those
institutions which represent the ultimate protector of the entire
"organized society." A retired federal district judge has said:
Confidence in and respect for our trial courts is an absolute necessity for the preservation of our form of government. Such courts
must be preserved from all taint of commercialism and sensationalism.

30

This can be classified as either a physical or a psychological interference, or both.
A 1952 special ABA committee reported:
To treat trials as mere entertainment, educational or otherwise, is to
deprive the court of the dignity which pertains to it and can only
impede that serious quest for truth for which all judicial forums
31
are established.
2

Quiat, The Freedom of Pressure and the Explosive Canon 85, 33 Rocky
Mt L.
29 Rev. 11, 16 (1960).
A Tennessee Circuit Court judge, writing on the point, stated:
Our courts were established for the administration of justice.
Lawyers are men set apart by law to expound to all persons who seek
them the law of the land, relating to high interests of property, liberty and life. The relation he bears to his client and to the court
implies the highest trust and confidence. The client lays bare to his
attorney Ins very nature and heart; leans and relies upon him for
support and protection m the saddest hours of his life. Knowing not
which way to go to attain Ins rights, he puts himself under the
guidance of his attorney, and firmly believes that he will lead him
aright. Thus the duty rests heavily upon the court to see in this
solemn hour that justice is done. The business of the court is grave
and the judge should see that dignity and solemnity prevail. Smith,
Judicial Ethics and Courtroom Decorum, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 26, 31
(1959).
3
0 Wilkin, Judicial Canon 85 Should Not Be Changed, 48 A.B.AJ. 540, 541
(1962).
31 Douglas, supra note 18, at 4. The head of the American Bar Association s
1955 special committee on Canon 35 cited recent examples which cast doubt
whether there is a "serious quest for truth." He stated:
In recent years we have witnessed in the hearings before some
congressional committees many examples of the fact-finding process
turned into irresponsible inquisitions for the entertainment of the
public. McCoy, The Judge and Courtroom Publicity, 37 J. Am. Jud.
Socy 167, 181 (1954).
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The ground for tis objection perhaps arose in great measure from
the infamous Bruno Hauptmann trial and its entertainment image,
which, in large part, brought about Canon 35 as mentioned supra.
3. Media claims to equal access
Another adjunct of the media's assertion of freedom of speech
is their insistence that all the media of the press have an equal right
to be present and to report-each in its own way-the proceedings
of the court. The argument is that since newspaper pencil reporters
are allowed free access to compose word pictures of the proceedings,
the media should be allowed to report in their own unique ways.
The basis of the contention is that the media should be allowed
to represent the public to as great an extent as possible, giving the
public the full benefit of the technological improvements that have
taken place over the past 20 years. In addition the media say they
furnish a completely accurate report of the proceedings since impressions of the actual proceedings are transmitted, whereas the pencil
reporters typically record their impressions which obviously must
contain opinion.32 However, the media have never been successful
in their effort to rebut the argument that since they cannot report
the entire proceedings because of their inherent time problem, they
too, tend toward an inaccurate portrayal since they must select only
portions to be reported and this involves discretion. A further consideration is that since these media must of necessity program for the
largest audience possible, the selection will cater toward the sensational, entertaining portions of the proceedings, which tend to give
the public a distorted view of the administration of justice.
In discarding the media arguments as without merit, the Canon
35 study committee in its report to the House of Delegates gave the
profession's representative answer:
Radio and television reporters have exactly the same nghts as the
newspaper reporter
to come to court, observe the proceedings,
and
33
report [their] observations over radio and television.
32

Miller, supra note 5, at 892.
s3 Amencan Bar News, supra note 10, at 3. A member of the committee m
a separate article, addressing himself to this point, said:
The courts are just as accessible to all media as they are to the
pencil reporter. The broadcasters can and do gather the news m the
courtroom and disseminate it many times each day through their
news commentanes. No one is barred from any courtroom. The complaint is that they can't gather the news in the ways they preferwith cameras and microphones. The media want something more.
It might be called 'freedom of the lens and microphones.
Tink
ham, supra note 18, at 844,

NoTEs
However, even if it is granted that the audio-video media are being
discriminated against, it is only because their particular methods
of reporting conflict with the necessary operations of a court in dispensing impartial justice, which, as stated, must prevail.
B. Public "Right to Know"

The media have seized on the portion of the sixth amendment
to the federal constitution that "the accused shall enjoy the right to
a
public trial" and similar provisions in the constitutions of
41 states,3 4 in asserting that they as members of the public have a
right to attend criminal trials, and that the general public has a
right to attend through their media. The profession, on the other
hand, answers that the guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused only. The result is one of the most controversial
phases of the discussion of Canon 35.
The media assert that the guarantee of a public trial is two-fold.
One writer summarizes:
First, it is one of the safeguards granted to a defendant in a criminal action. It is deemed an nnportant element of a fair trial granted
to a defendant so that he may be secure in knowing that he will
be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. To this extent
the right may be deemed a personal one.
[T]he second purpose
of the guarantee [is] the right belonging to the public to be kept
iaformed. By the requirement that trials be public there has been
established a potent safeguard against the possible use of the courts
as institutions of persecution.
To the extent the public has an
interest in preventing a repetition of the Star Chamber, this right
must be deemed public.3 5

Thus satisfying themselves that they as members of the public have

rights to attend, the media then reason along these lines:
Should the publics nght of access to the court be confined to that
part of the public which is present in the courtroom or should it be
extended as far as modem facilities can extend it, to those who can

view the proceedings on television screens, films or in the newspaper columns?
Those who ight view the proceedings on
television surely would constitute a more representative cross section

of the society which the court serves.

so

Although there is language in the opinions of some courts wuch
accepts the view that the sixth amendment guarantee of a public
trial has this twofold purpose, the great weight of authority holds
the right belongs solely to the accused.37 As stated by Cooley3

4 Cedarquist, supra note 24, at 108.

1S
32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 281, 287 (1959).

38

6 Wiggins, Should Canon 85 be Amended? A Newspaperman Speaks For
the News
Media, 42 A.B.A.J. 838, 839 (1956).
3
7 Cedarquist, supra note 24, at 108.
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The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
that the public
condemned.38
Representative of the majority view is Unzted Press Ass'n v. Valente,3 9
decided in 1954 in New York. The court said:
It is for the defendant alone to determine whether, and to what exTo
tent, he shall avail himself of [the right to a public trial].
permit outsiders to interfere with the defendant's own conduct of
his defense would not only upset the orderly workings of the judicial
process, but could well redound to the defendant's exceeding prejudice. The publics interest is adequately safeguarded as long as
on his own
the accused himself is given the opportunity to assert
40
his right to a trial that is fair and publi.
behalf
Even if the right is said to be one belonging to the general public,
the minority of cases so holding recognizes it as being far from absolute.4i This right is held subordinate to the power of the court to
administer a fair trial, just as is the freedom of the press.
The majority view is believed to be on much more solid ground.
There are two reasons for this conclusion: (1) If the general public
has a right to attend the accused's trial, then the accused cannot waive
his right to the derogation of the public s right even where it would
be prejudicial to the accused for the public to attend. This is especially true where the accused has committed a crime considered by
the public to be heinous. This was the subject of the matter before
the court in the Valente case where a photographer sought to enjoin
a judge from enforcing an order barring the general public from
the courtroom. In upholding the exclusion, the court said:
Actually petitioners are seeking to convert what is essentially the

right of the particular accused into a privilege for every citizen, a
of, and even
privilege wuch the latter may invoke independently
42
in hostility to, the rights of the accused.

The court further stated the public has no such right, since the accused may deem it to his benefit to bar the public in certain cases.
(2) The real basis of the media s assertion of the public's right to
a "public trial," is the assertion of the public's "right to know" of
the proceedings of a government body so as to keep it within its
constitutional boundaries. As one writer artfully phrases it:
as i Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 647 (8th ed. 1927).

39 140 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 123 N.E. 2d 777 (1954).
40 Id. at 74, 123 N.E. 2d at 780.
41
The Oklahoma court, in recognizing the two rights involved, said:
These conflicts must be resolved so as not to do violence to
the civil liberties of the individual, the rights of the public, and so
as not to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings and
degrade the court. Lyles v. State, 330 P. 2d 734 (Oka. 1958).
42 140 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 75, 123 N.E. 2d 777, 781 (1954).
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The basic problem is
to distinguish between the right to a
public trial and the publics right to a trial-or
to distinguish
43
between the public interest and what interests the public.

The right to know is nothing more than another phrasing of freedom
of the press. The basic thought behind the assertion of the right to
know was best phrased by Justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 44 where he said:
One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens there, to the end that the public may
judge whether our sys45
tem of criminal justice is fair and nght.
Justice Douglas, commenting on the Valente case, said:
The concept of the public trial is not that every member of the
community should be able to see or hear it. A public trial means
one that is open rather than closed.
The public trial exists be-

cause of the aversion which liberty-loving people had toward secret
trials and proceedings. That is the reason our courts are open to
the public, not because the framers wanted to provide the public
with recreation or with instruction in the ways of government.
As long as the defendant is assured the right to invoke the

guarantees provided for his protection, the public interest is safe and
secure, and there is neither need nor reason for outsiders to interject themselves into the conduct of the trial.46
However, it matters not whether the assertion is really freedom
of the press or of a public right to a "public trial," because the question finally resolves itself into what has been called, one of "socialpsychological philosophy."
What is the privilege of a public to disclosure and examination of
society s efforts at justice? What is the effect upon justice and fairness of disclosure to the public?
If there is probability that observation affects the [judicial] process, which shall prevail in the
ultimate conflict between the free speech and press and the rode47
pendant judiciary in our Constitutional government?
43 Swindler, Commentary on Press Photographers and the Courtroom, 35
Neb. L. Rev. 13, 14 (1956).

44338 U.S. 912 (1950).

45
Id.at 920.
46
Douglas, supra note 18, at 5. One writer raises the following point:
The media have elaborated on the public trial' argument to the
point where it might almost seem that John Lilburne made his famous
attack on Star Chamber proceedings in the England of 1649 for the

sole purpose of assuring newsmen and their heirs of a right of
access to court proceedings. Nothing could be farther from the

truth. John Lilburne was a cantankerous and obstinate tndindualist who was insisting on hs right to a fair and public trial. And
this, essentially, is what the right to a public trial means today.
it is the right of the individual defendant in a criminal case to
have enough of the public present to assure that he is fairly tried and
judged. Cedarquist, supra note 24, at 109.
47 Quiat, supra note 28, at 17.
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However, it is recognized that the press does have certain duties
in satisfying the public's right to know. In the words of one writer, the
public interest requires that
the people should see and hear at proceedings in order that they
might know how the participants-including the judges-behaved
themselves, thus learning about their government and acquiring
confidence m their judicial remedies; that
the witnesses should
give their testimony in public, in order that key witnesses, unknown to the parties, might be induced thereby voluntarily to come
forward and give important testimony- that witnesses, knowing they
are subject to the attention and scrutiny
of the public at large,
48
would be more apt to tell the truth.
Public trials also educate citizens as to their rights where they
might not have known them before:
[Tihe public proceedings of the court operate as a check and deterrent upon those who might otherwise be inclined to commit offenses. They see in the proceedings what the law means to forbid.
They are furnished examples of the consequences
of wrong doing and
49
the certainty of detection and puishment.
Whether the public right to know is a full-fledged right in itself

or is merely a healthy by-product of the recognized purpose of the
freedom of
erations, it
press to the
istration of

the press in keeping a close watch on governmental opis in the public interest and should be pursued by the
limit, i.e., until there is interference with the fair adminjustice in a court of law. 50

C. Right of Privacy of Trial Participants
On several occasions, the court has claimed it has a duty to protect the participants in a trial in their rights of privacy and used this
assertaion as one of the grounds to exclude the audio-video media.
This particular right has always been used in conjunction with the
interest in a fair trial in the exclusion, and a survey indicates it has
never been used as the sole ground. This perhaps would indicate
the judiciary's lack of complete confidence in the merits of its assertion. Nevertheless, in support of the claim, the judiciary has used
48

Miller, supra note 5, at 890.
Wiggins, supra note 36, at 839.
0 In answer to a questionnaire sent to practicing attorneys, among others,
as part of a nationwide survey on Canon 35, one attorney wrote:
49
5

The Main reason for encouraging the public to attend trials

in the first place, and to have the context reported in the public

press, is to assure the public that our courts are free from bias and
undue influences, and to act as a check upon arbitrary policies of
any officer of the court. I do not believe that these desireable social
purposes would be enhanced by permitting photography. (Howard
H. Campbell, Portland, Oregon). Geis and Talley, supra note 22,
at 557.

Noms
rather confident language, as in Ex parte Sturm.51 In this case the
court, in stating liberty of the press does not include the privilege
of photographing an unwilling accused person, said:
The ordeal of the defendant's approaching trial was one to which
he was required to submit. But it was not essential that us humiliation should be intensified by his compulsory submission to a photographic portrayal, for publicity purposes, of his appearance.
[Als he was then under the court's control, it was natural and just
that the court should have a sense of responsibility for us protection against unauthorized invasions of his personal rights. If he had
not been in custody, he might 5have
defended humself against the
2
photographer s objectionable act.
In an earlier case, the court spoke of its "inherent duty" to safeguard a prisoner's privacy. 53 To the argument that the accused was
a public figure who had lost his right of privacy, the court said since
he was an involuntary subject of court restraint, it had a duty to
protect his right of privacy as well as his right to a fair trial.
The media have attacked the court's position principally on two
interrelated grounds: (1) That a court is a public institution about
which the public has a right to know, and, as such, is without grounds
for a claim to privacy for its participants; and, (2) that individuals
who seek the services of these institutions leave their "seclusion" and
become figures about which the public has a right to know.
The first ground appears based on the idea that the press should
vigorously exercise its function of checking governmental functions.
One writer states:
A court is a public institution. Trials
are public business
because they are important governmental functions. The courtroom
is public property. When a person enters a courtroom, whether to
participate or observe, and whether in response to process or other
court order, the protection of his privacy legally ceases to the ex54
tent of reporting such proceedings but not for any other purposes.
The second-mentioned ground amounts to an agreement that an
appearance by one in court is effective as a waiver to any claim of
right of privacy by the person:
The right of privacy is the right to live one s life in seclusion without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. There
are times, however, when one willingly or unwillingly becomes an
actor in, or otherwise identified with, an occurrence of public or
general interest
and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy
51 Ex parte Sturm, 186 AUt. 812 (Md. 1927).
52 Id.
53
5

4

(1962).

at 814.

In re Mack, 886 Pa. 251, 126 A. 2d 679 (1956).

Blashfeld, The Case of the Controversial Canon, 48 A.B.A.J. 429, 488
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to publish his picture with a true account of such occurrence. In
short, the law does not recognize the right of privacy in connection
with that which is inherently a public matter. 55

Possibly a third ground exists. One judge has applied the "equal
access" argument of the media as a ground for not recognizing a
right of privacyIf, on the basis of a defendant's right of privacy, he is not to be
photographed, reporters then should be prohibited from describing
him in written language, because a skilled and experienced writer
can often draw a word picture which can be as revealing as a
photograph. Thus, press artists should also be prohibited from draw56
mg pen-and-ink sketches of an accused.

The reasoning of these arguments appears sound and should
preclude the court from recognizing any rights of privacy in participants. However, in In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35,5r the
Colorado court recognized these rights in modifying its rule so as
to leave exclusion to the discretion of the individual judge in each
case; the Colorado rule provides the judge may allow the media,
but no witness or juror in attendance under subpoena shall be photographed or broadcast over his objection.
Whether or not there is a legal duty of the court to protect participants rights of privacy, there are certain ethical considerations
which undoubtedly carry much weight. As one committee reported:
Pictures of the accused, taken without his consent, and of witnesses
who are obliged to be present, often under circumstances of great

emotional distress, seem to a majority of us to impose an unnecessary hardship upon the doing of a duty wlch society demands.

The accused is still protected by the presumption of innocence and
would seem entitled not to be photographed without his consent
merely58because he is temporarily rendered unable to protect Ins own
nghts.
It may be reasonably concluded that on whatever basis the court
considers the protection of the privacy of participants, in excluding
audio-video media, whether this consideration -is purely legal or
merely ethical, it is assured of having at least some weight whether
overtly manifested or not.59
55
5 ibnd.
01n re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 270, 126 A. 2d 679, 697 (1956) (dissenting
opinion). Accord, Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W 2d 972 (1929).
57133 Colo. 417, 296 P. 2d 465 (1956).
58 Tinkham, supra note 18, at 885.
59 Since a subpoenaed witness cannot avoid testifying merely on the ground
that he will be embarrassed or damaged by his testimony, unless discriminating,
one writer concludes:
It is believed that almost all judges and lawyers will agree that
it is improper to force a witness to testify in front of a camera.
(Continued on next page)

NoTES
III. THE LEGAL LIMITS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY POWER OF THE COURT

Up until now, in discussing the courts' absolute power over the
procedure in the courtroom to the derogation of the media's rights,
this note has assumed the media's exclusion was reasonably necessary
to maintain the fair administration of justice. It must now be considered whether this assumption is necessarily justified in every case,
and if not, whether the absolute exclusion should be continued.
Concerning itself with the existence of the unquestionable exclusionary power of the court, the Colorado court, in In re Hearings
Concerning Canon 35, stated:
No one demes the existence of broad powers inherent m the
judiciary. This power unquestionably includes the right of the courts
to determine the manner in which they shall operate in order to
administer justice with dignity and decorum, and in such manner
as shall be conducive to fair and impartial trials and the ascertainment of truth uninfluenced by extraneous matter or distractions.60

However, this power is subject to restraint. There is a certain condition precedent to its exercise. Considering the high degree of protection afforded freedom of speech and press, the public's right to
know, and the great purpose in closely checking an important governmental function, the court should use its power only when reasonably necessary to maintain the fair administration of justice. Unless
the court's action is well-grounded these important purposes are
arbitrarily subverted, certainly in contravention of the Constitutional guaranties.
The Colorado court likened the situation to those cases involving civil rights versus the public policy. It said:
In every case the power to regulate must not be arbitrarily inposed;
it must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly
to infringe the protected freedom.
We must take precautionary
measures to guard against two dangers: first, lest under the guise
of preserving dignity and decorum m court cases the civil liberties
guaranteed under our Bill of Rights be unnecessarily invaded or
nullified; second, lest using the Bill of Bights as a cloak, individuals
are permitted 'to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings
by the use of camera, radio or television in the course

of a trial.61
The court, by its adoption of a relaxed exclusionary rule, implied
that an absolute exclusion "unnecessarily invaded or nullified" freedom of speech and press.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Indeed the prosect of receiving such treatment in court might well
deter witnessesfrom coming forward and testifying, to such a point
as actually to obstruct justice.
Cedarquist, supra note 24, at 162.
60 188 Colo. 417, ....... 296 P. 2d 465, 467 (1956).
61 Id. at 468.
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A. Traditionally, the Courts Have Predicated
Their Power on a Threat of Physical Interference
As to what is or what is not an interference with the fair administration of justice, it is well to begin by saying the courts have
jealously defended the theory that they are the proper agencies
to determine this question. As stated in the Sturm case:
It is essential to the integrity and independence of judicial tribunals
that they shall have the power to enforce their own judgment as to
what conduct is incompatible with the proper and orderly course
of their procedure. If their discretion should be subordinated to
that of a newspaper manager m regard to the use of photograplnc
instruments in the courtroom, it would be difficult to limit the further
reduction to which the authority of the courts would be exposed.
It would be utterly inconsistent with the position and prerogatives
of the judiciary, as a coordinate branch of government, to require
its submission to the judgment of a non-governmental
62 agency as to
a question of proper conduct in the judicial forums.
Traditionally the test, in determining whether the condition
precedent to the court's exercise of its exclusion power exists, Is
whether such exclusion is reasonably necessary to maintain the fair
administration of justice. 63 The courts have based this determination
on actual or threatened physical interference.6 4 This is the sole basis
on which Canon 35 is predicated.
B. The Threat to Canon 35
The audio-video media are asserting, and daily proving, that they
no longer pose a physical threat making their exclusion "reasonably necessary" to maintain the fair administration of justice. This
is the chief weapon of the media in their attack on Canon 35. Their
ammunition is the recent decisions of the Colorado and Oklahoma
courts and the relaxing of the rule in Texas, to the effect that the
threat of interference from the media has been so greatly reduced by
technological refinements that the decision as to the exclusion should
be made in each case after a decision by the individual judge.
1. Technological refinements in media equipment
The technological advancements made by the audio-visual media,
and television in particular, have been remarkable. 65 Television
and still cameras are no longer bulky, are noiseless, need only natural
62 Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114.......... 136 Atl. 312, 315 (1927). Cf. Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F 2d 383 (3d Cir. 1958).
63 State v. Clifford, 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N.E. 2d 853 (1954).
64 Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grmes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E. 2d 421 (1960).
05 For an excellent summary of the technological refinements, see Blashfeld,
supra note 54.
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light and can be placed outside the courtroom so that only a tiny
hole in the wall evidences their presence. Microphones are now so
small, and sensitive that they may be completely hidden. Even
though the media emphasize the Colorado and Oklahoma decisions
as proof that they do not cause disturbances in all instances, most of
the great refinements in equipment, through the use of transistors,
have occurred since these decisions. In this light, they take on added
weight. The Colorado court, in adopting an exclusionary rule to be
exercised in the discretion of the individual judge in each case, was
speaking through Referee Moore when it said:
For six days I listened to evidence and witnessed demonstrations
which proved conclusively that the assumption of facts as stated sn
the canon is wholly without support tn reality. At least one hun-

dred photographs were taken at various stages of the hearing which
were printed and introduced as exhibits. All of them were taken

without the least disturbance or mterefenice with the proceedings,
and with one or two exceptions, without any knowledge on my part
that photographs were being taken.
Radio microphones were not
discovered by me until my attention was specifically directed to
their location.
The television cameras
were of several kinds,
varying
to the small one which is 4" x 5" x 7" in size. All
equipment used
is capable of installation outside the courtroom
with only an otherwise concealed door or window
many persons
entered and retired from the courtroom without being aware that a
live telecast was in progress. 66 (Emphasis added.)
Another advancement, non-technical in nature, was a factor in
both the Colorado and Oklahoma decasions. To avoid the inevitable
clamor of each audio-video outlet setting up its own individual equipment, the outlets formed "pools" whereby only one set of equipment

was installed and the other outlets joined the "feed" from the courtroom. Therefore, the judge had to supervise the location of only
one set of equipment and confer with only one representative.
These are just two of many demonstrations. Another was the televising of a murder trial in Waco, Texas, in 1955. After the trial
the Waco-McLennon County Bar Association reported that:
[T]he fact that the trial was being televised seemed to dignify the
proceedings and that the case was more orderly than any other of
like importance and public interest with as many lawyers involved.
Judge Bartlett stated that there was no grandstanding' by the
witnesses or the attorneys and the television camera was no more
67
distracting than a court reporter taking notes.
The most successful experiment of this type is being conducted in
Michigan. There, the law school of the University of Michigan has
66
In
67

re Hearings, supra note 57, at 468.
Blashfield, supra note 54, at 482.
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installed a remote-control camera in the courtroom of the circuit
court of Washtenaw County for the purpose of watching its proceedings by closed circuit at the college. The procedure has worked
68
smoothly and the judge reports there is no loss of decorum.
2. The psychological interferences
Despite the growing number of courts that are beginning to admit
the media because they are satisfied the media cause no physical
interference, the House of Delegates chose to reaffirm the old wording
based on a threat of physical interference. The special study committee, in recommending no substantial change, acknowledged that
photography and broadcasting
have made great advances in technology and techniques. Yet, the
very presence in the courtroom of various photographic and sound
devices, with operators working under the intensely competitive pressures of their craft, tend to cause distractions and are disruptive of
the judicial atmosphere in which trials should be conducted. We
feel that a serious doubt exists that a fair trial can be guaranteed
69
if Canon 35 is relaxed.
What the committee failed to realize is that state courts are relaxing
the canon because it is defenseless to the media demonstrations. If
the committee feels a "serious doubt exists that a fair trial can be
guaranteed if Canon 35 is relaxed," the solution is clear. The canon
should be bolstered with the inclusion of the real reason why the
mer'ia should be excluded, i.e., the psychological interferences. Without such a change it appears possible that fifty separate relaxed canons
will result.
With the advent of the great refinements by the media, the profession, in defending Canon 85, has had the rely on reasons which
are extrinsic to those stated in the canon. The profession clams
that even if there are no threats of physical interference, there certainly ar psychological interferences. This, of course, disregards the
fact that the canon excludes only because of physical interferences.
As stated by Dean Griswold:
In any event, noise and disturbance in the courtroom are only a part
of the problem. Even if this could be completely controlled, as under
ideal conditions, as merely may be, there would still remain the
fact of broadcasting and televising, and the inevitable psychological
impact which arises from
that fact. This is by far the most important
70
aspect of the matter.
Tis is the general opinion. A nationwide survey indicated that
judges' basic objection to the media was that they would interfere
6s
id. at 429.
6
9 American Bar News, supra note 10, at 4.
70

Gnswold, supra note 14, at 617.
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with the orderly processes of justice, and the main factor was not
physical but psychological interference.71
What are these psychological interferences? Generally, they can
be defined as the reactions of participants to the knowledge that a
great number of people are watching their every more, or the effort
required to prevent such reactions.
Any list of these interferences would be incomplete because new
ones arise with every fact situation. However there are six frequently
mentioned:
(1) "The presence and participation of a vast, unseen audience
creates a strained and tense atmosphere that will not be
conducive to the quiet search for truth." 72 The resulting effect
on most witnesses is obvious. 73 A practicing lawyer has stated:
No matter how naively the proponents argue that their cameras
will not be noticed m the courtroom, the pictures will be printed
m the daily newspapers and appear on TV screens, and the radio
will broodcast its verbatim reports, with comments. And when that
has happened a few times, the timid person will be more fearful.
Already reluctant to face the comparatively mild publicity of the
courtroom, the mere possibility that he may be photographed, televised and broadcast for the world to see his struggle to express himself and to outwit the crossexammer-that mere possibility will
greatly increase his reluctance to testify.74
To those who would claim a layman is so ill-at-ease in a trial

that he would not be too concerned with his appearance to the masses
over the media, it is sufficient to refer to a statement by a professional
news commentator:
The most experienced performers in show business know the hor-

rors of stage fright before they go on television. This psychological

and emotional burden must not be placed on a layman whose testi-

mony may have a bearing on whether, in a murder trial, another
human being is to live or die. The administration of justice is more
75
important than a few fleeting movements of fascinating television.

(2) Trial participants are made actors, willingly or not. As
the special study committee stated:
If they are unwilling actors, then their dignity as human beings and
perhaps their vital legal rights are violated. If willing actors, then
71

Ceis and Talley, supra note 22, at 553.
Douglas, supra note 18, at 5.
The human element -is predominant in our entire system of justice. Any
influence which distorts it or tends to affect its normal functioning impedes the
court in its search for the truth-a search which is difficult enough at best. Malone,
Courtroom Televmon and Administration of Justice, 26 J. Bar Ass n Kan. 302,
72
73

306 74
(1958).

Cantrall, A Country Lawyer Looks at Canon 85, 47 A.B.A.J. 761 (1961).

75 N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1956, p....... , col ........

KENCKY LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 51,

they may be even more dangerous because their concern may well
be their effectiveness as actors rather than compliance with their
oaths.76
(8) The judge is given further burdens of supervising press
arrangements in addition to his regular judicial duties of
seeing to the fair administration of justice. He is given the
duties of supervising the arrangement of equipment, determining the number of media reporters, declaring parts of the
room that are ruled to be off limits, prohibiting the photographing and broadcasting of a witness who so objects, censoring those parts of the trial that might affect public morals,
settling intra-media disputes, and dealing with other imponderables. It is obvious the "quiet search for truth" might
not be so quiet. It is equally obvious that the judge just might
7
not have time to supervise the proceedings of the case at bar '
(4) Vote-conscious prosecutors and judges might exploit the

opportunity for private gain. Justice Douglas points up this
possibilityThe opportunities for men to exploit the situation are greatly multiplied. Prosecutors usually run for office. And nowadays about threefourths of our states provide for the election of judges
prosecutors and judges-as well as defense counsel-are human; and the
temptation to play to the galleries will be stronger than any can
resist.7 8
One writer reveals another danger:
As for the lawyer participants, it is not difficult to conjure up the
impetus and encouragement that photography and broadcasting would
give to that growing group who now practice and advocate
dramatic
79
and sensational effects with demonstrative evidence.

(5) The image of the courts as dignified, reserved, and worthy
to be the final arbiter of most important rights is tarnished.
In a recent case, a federal court stated:
The very thought of members of the press and/or amateur photographers and others employing cameras, no matter how silent and
concealed, to photograph different parties and witnesses to a court
proceeding while the parties are engrossed in the determination
of matters of tremendous moment to the parties involved, is repugnant to the high standard of judicial decorum to which our
76 American Bar News, Feb. 1, 1963 (Press release).
77 Cf. Tinkham, supra note 18; Cedarquist, supra note 24.
78 Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1
(1960).
79 Tinkham, Should Canon 85 be Amended? A Question of Proper Judicial
Administration, 42 A.B.A.J. 843, 845 (1956).
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courts are accustomed and, indeed, may prove an opening wedge
80
to a gradual detenoration of the judicial process.

(6) As previously discussed, the participants' right of privacy,
if any, is violated.
Aside from these interferences, there is a further danger involved because pictures or broadcasts, which must be selective, may
distort the trial, inflame the proceeding by depicting an unimportant
minscule of the whole, or lower the judicial process in public eyes
by partraying only the sensational or entertaining moments.
All of these interferences tend to cause a serious threat to the
administration of justice and represent the real reasons why the audiovideo media should not be admitted to the courtroom. This is especially true when it is considered that the media will be attracted primarily to those cases involving emotion-packed issues which inherently require a greater degree of care in the avoidance of any extraneous distractions.
3. The discretionary exclusion rule
The media do not dispute the fact that there are threats of psychological interference but argue that they do not exist in every case as
the absolute exclusion rule would indicate, and that each judge
should be allowed to decide in each case if there exists a threat of
interference.
This argument, on its face, is the most forceful the press has to
offer. It has been the one which has been the primary cause for the
three states to "revolt" and permit the media in the discretion of
each judge.
The very heart of the press argument against Canon 35 was stated
most clearly by James S. Pope, president of the American Society
of Newspaper Editors:
We object to Canon 35 because it does not simply underline
the inportance of dignity, but sets up an arbitrary prohibition
against the camera, which today can frequently be used with as
little offense or commotion as a pencil making notes on paper. We
think the judgment m individual cases should be left to the
judges. 8

The results of a nationwide survey of individual editors bears
out this view. The general opinion of the editors was that Canon
35 takes from the individual judge the liberty of action which is
rightfully his. They reached this conclusion by the observation that

80 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F Supp. 486, 494 (W.D.
Pa. 1957), aft'd, 254 F 2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
81 Bulletin of the Amencan Society of Newspaper Editors, Jan. 1, 1954, p. 5.
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although supporters of the canon interject every conceivable extrinsic
argument possible, the bare fact remains that the canon relates physical
interference with dignity and decorum and cameras no longer so
82
interfere.
This compelling logic was the cornerstone of the Colorado and
Oklahoma decisions. These courts reasoned that in view of the great
utility in protecting freedom of speech and press to the greatest
possible extent, and the proof they had seen that the equipment
no longer necessarily physically interfered with the decorum in
every case, the absolute exclusion rule, based on threat of physical
interference, was no longer justified. Rather, whether a threat existed
83
should be determined by each judge in each case.
4. The case for absolute excluszon
If one believes in continuing the exclusion of media from the
courtroom, these cases demonstrate the need for changing the wording of the canon so as to comprehend not only physical but psychological interferences. Even though the canon expressly states as one
of the reasons for excluding media that they "distract participants and
witnesses in giving testimony," this phrase is not interpreted as compassing psychological interferences. The Colorado and Oklahoma
decisions are sound, as based on the presently interpreted canon, and
it is highly conceivable that other states will adopt their position.
The basic assumption of the canon as now interpreted is that the
exclusion of the media on grounds of a physical interference is
reasonably necessary to the fair administration of justice. This is no
longer true as these recent cases hold.
There is one argument which tends to prove that the discretionary exclusion rule cannot produce the proper result. The main
facet of this argument is that if individual judges are given the
discretion to decide in each case whether to allow the media, their
decisions will not always be objectively reached in view of the massive
pressure of the media which will be brought to bear on them.84
Dean Griswold points up the danger:
8
2 Geis and Talley, Cameras rn the Courtroom, 47 J. Crnm. L., C. & P.S. 546,
551 (1956-1957).
3
8 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 133 Colo. 417, 296 P. 2d 465
(1956); Lyles v. State, 330 P. 2d 734 (Okla. 1958).
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Tis facet appears to be one of the main reasons behind the ABA special

committee s recommendation to retain Canon 35. In the committees report to
the House, the group stated:
Since most of our state judges still are elected in political campaigns, an which their success can be affected by the media of public

commuication, it is unfair to subject them to potentially powerful
(Continued on next page)
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We should not forget that a very high proportion of the judges
[I]t is simply unfalr
for the
in this country are elected.
profession to leave them in a position where they can be subjected
to the intense pressure which we knew can be brought by newspapers, radio and television. Those who decide not to allow broadcasting and televising will be subjected to the charge that they
have discriminated, that they are old-fashioned, and that they are not
as concerned with pleasing the public as are the judges who do
allow broadcasting and televising from the courtrooms. And when
the next election comes, such judge will surely run the very serious
risk that the organs of communication to the public will take a dim
view about the desirability of his re-election.
Of course, there would be judges who would not allow broadcasting or television under any circumstances. Such judges should
not have to go through the time-consuming process, case after case,
of patiently hearing representations about this matter.
It is here
that the problem appears as one which ivolves
a truly professional responsibility. Insofar as a decision against
broadcasting and televising is unpopular in certain quarters, the
brunt of the decision should be taken by the profession as a whole,
and should not be shifted to individual judges.8 5
This appears to be one of the major reasons the ABA has retained
the absolute exclusion rule. In fact, before reaffirming the old canon,
a motion to adopt the discretionary exclusion rule was tabled with
very few dissents.86 One of the other important facets of the argument is that to allow the media access to the courtroom is to place
on the judge distractions and disturbances which are imnmical to
judicial conduct.
In commenting on the argument that "pooling" arrangements
alleviate some of these distractions, the ABA special committee stated:
The most recent example of the failure of any such
system
was clearly exhibited at the outset of the Billie Sol Estes trial
Quoting from press reports that the courtroom at Tyler, Texas, was
crowded with cameras and other broadcast gear, the report said this
unconscionable situation was somewhat corrected' later by the trial
judge requiring the cameras to be partially hidden behind screens.
'However, the report added, similar instances have come to our
attention when the case was deemed sufficiently newsworthy and
the competition was keen for electromc reporting advantages.'8 7
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

pressures for a favorable decision as to courtroom privileges, the
emal of which may result in open and effective opposition of the
disappointed media. American Bar News, supra note 76, at 7.
85
Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not
Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 615, 616 (1962). This is the view adopted by the
special committee. In its report, the committee stated:
The right to a fair trial does not belong to the trial judge to
dispense or curtail as he sees fit.
We believe that the decision
should be made by the legal profession acting through the rulemaking authorities. American Bar News, supra note 76, at 4.
8
6 American Bar News, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 1, Feb. 15, 1963,
s8 American Bar News, supra note 76, at 6.
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Normally, the individual judge is the one who determines whether
there exists a threat to the fair administration of justice. But he
should not be forced to be the one who determines whether the
media have access to his courtroom because of the umque considerations involved. The decision should be made if at all by the
profession. Thus, it is clear that the House of Delegates has made
the correct decision in retaining the absolute exclusion feature of
Canon 35. However, it failed to provide the canon's defenders with
sufficient basis to justify its decision to media which possess powerful
arguments.
IV

CONCLUSION

The decision by the profession to leave Canon 35 as is and to defend its exclusionary feature on grounds extrinsic to its original
purpose and its unchanged language, is producing several undesirable
results both to the media and the profession.
To the media, the retention of the canon's phraseology is a direct
and arbitrary rebuff. The media have proved they do not do what
the rule says they do-interfere with the physical decorum of the
courtroom. Yet this same rule precludes the media from performing
their chief function. The media then are again precluded from suc
cessfully asserting their valuable right to freedom of speech and press
because the profession's members in the courts assert the right must
be compromised, but for reasons not included in the exclusion
rule. To the media this practice is at least unfair and quite possibly
a denial of due process. All of the cases on the point hold that the
exercise of the court's exclusion power must be reasonably necessary
to maintain the fair administration of justice. If Canon 35 is to be
taken as the standard, then the press has a mentorous claim to admittance to court. Since the media have not been successful in their
assertions in the courts, they feel forced to resort to extra-judicial
proceedings. The only remaining means of asserting their rights is to
conduct a massive campaign to the general population. Not deciding whether they are justified in such procedure, the fact remains
that the profession is promoting the very thing which it was designed to extinguish-the substitution of rule by emotional appeal to
the masses for rule by reason.
To the profession the retention of the old canon produces two
unsatisfactory results. First, it reduces the probability of the profession's success in continuing the absolute exclusion rule. Retention
of the physical interference theory encourages individual states to
accede to media claims because the canon is defenseless to their arguments and demonstrations. Also, with each state's profession going
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its separate way on the issue, the effectiveness of the entire profession is destroyed, even though most of the members might believe
absolute exclusion is needed.
Secondly, the respect for the profession is badly tarnished. The
profession has been entrusted with the heavy duty of protecting
the individual and collective rights of our society including freedom of speech and press. In carrying out tis duty it is inescapable
that some rights of individuals or groups will have to be compromised when their exercise involves conduct which causes interference
with the system that protects all rights. This inherent authority,
however, must be used in as reserved a manner and degree as possible and invoked only when it is reasonably necessary. Otherwise,
the profession would destroy that which it is entrusted to preserve.
In the retention of the old phraseology of Canon 35, the profession outwardly appears to be using the inherent authority in an
arbitrary manner. This power is being used against the media when
it is not necessary. Although its use of the power is justified, the
basis of the justification lies outside the boundaries of the reasons
stated in the rule. The result is a loss of respect for the profession.
This takes on greater significance when it is realized that it is lost
to such a persuasive group as the media.
The media have proved the stated reasons for the rule no longer
exist and therefore neither should the rule. The profession replies
that there are reasons for the rule but it refuses either to formally
state them or to repeal the outdated rule. As a result, the profession
invites disrespect and the consequences of such. It is not the media
that are distracting from the "essential dignity" of the courts, but
in fact, the profession itself. Above all, the profession should be
aware of the old maxim, that the first step toward confidence in the
government, including the courts, is confidence in and respect for,
those individuals who administer the same. The consequences of
the disease are too calamitous and the remedy too easy, to simply
ignore.88
Harold D. Rogers
88 A suggested wording of the canon is that contained in the recommendation

made by the Special Committee of the Amencan Bar Foundation and submitted
to the House of Delegates in February, 1958, which subsequently was turned
down:
The purpose of ]udicial proceedings is to ascertain the truth.
Such proceedings should be conducted with fitting dignity and deconm, in a manner conducive to undisturbed deliberation, indicative of their importance to the people and to the litigants, and in
an atmosphere that bespeaks the responsibilities of those who are
charged with the administration of justice. The taking of photo(Continued on next page)

